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This Essay looks at the interplay of market opening, competition, and regulation in the air
transport, telecom, and financial services areas, which are particularly relevant to the transatlantic
relationship between the U.S. and Europe.
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INTRODUCTION
Transatlantic trade and investment is one of the major back-
bones of today's global economy. Ties between the European
Union ("EU") and the United States have traditionally been
strong, with relatively open systems and largely similar values.
Since the end of 1995, however, reflecting an increasing interde-
pendence going beyond traditional economic issues, the rela-
tionship has had a new foundation that has put economic issues
in a wider context. The New Transatlantic Agenda, adopted at
the U.S.-EU summit of December 1995, sets out a blueprint for
closer cooperation in four areas: promoting peace and stability,
democracy, and development in the world; responding in com-
mon to global challenges, from fighting drug trafficking, money
laundering, or terrorism, to promoting efforts to protect the en-
vironment; contributing to commercial relations in the expan-
sion of world trade and closer economic relations; and strength-
ening transatlantic ties through closer people-to-people links.
In spite of these larger political goals, economic relations
remain at the heart of ourjoint day-to-day business and still pro-
duce the most concrete results on both sides of the Atlantic.
The sheer size of mutual direct investment is impressive - U.S.
companies have so far invested some US$350 billion in the Euro-
pean Union, whereas the cumulative value of EU investment in
the United States stands at around US$370 billion. It also has
tangible results: nearly six million U.S. jobs are supported, di-
rectly or indirectly, by European investment, with a correspond-
ing pattern in the European Union.
While this relationship is already complex, highly devel-
oped, and mature, improvements are not beyond reach. Trans-
atlantic tariffs are already very low, so further tariff reductions
will only produce modest real benefits. Focus has, therefore,
shifted to non-tariff barriers which can be just as obstructive and
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cumbersome as customs duties but have effects on both trade
and investment, which are often more difficult to calculate. In
addition, attention has been directed to opening markets that
previously had been closed to transatlantic competition.
This Essay looks at the interplay of market opening, compe-
tition, and regulation in the air transport, telecom, and financial
services areas, which are particularly relevant to the transatlantic
relationship.
I. BALANCING OPENNESS WITH SAFEGUARDS
Non-tariff barriers appear in two basic guises: public barri-
ers and private ones. Classic examples of public barriers are
product requirements such as standards, as well as the methods
by which respect for such requirements are examined and veri-
fied. In the private arena, the most serious obstacles are created
by anti-competitive behavior, such as agreements to restrict com-
petition, whether domestic or international, or the misuse of
economic power through, for example, the exclusionary prac-
tices of a monopolist firm. Sometimes the distinction between
the public or private character of these obstacles becomes
blurred, for example in cases where monopolies are mandated
or tolerated by a public authority.
Today, there is general agreement on both sides of the At-
lantic that competition is the key driving force behind efficiency,
innovation, and entrepreneurial spirit. Even in sectors tradition-
ally considered too vulnerable or sensitive to be exposed to the
full rigors of market forces - for example, transport, banking
and insurance, postal and telecommunications services, and agri-
culture - the barriers are coming down as we see whether a
more competition-oriented environment cannot produce better
results.
But, both in the European Union and the United States,
deregulation of these industries has been accompanied by a fun-
damental debate about the extent to which public authorities
should require the provision of some public services where a
normally functioning competitive market would not provide
them. There is question, for example, regarding the offering of
affordable telephone services in remote rural areas. In addition
to these "universal service" problems, it has long been recog-
nized that certain safeguards, in the form of competition rules,
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are necessary to provide opportunities for new entrants to com-
pete effectively and to prevent competition from developing in a
way that goes against the interests of the consumer.
The challenge is clearly to strike the right balance, in each
case, between free competition and regulation. Even as compe-
tition is "created" by breaking down regulatory barriers and al-
lowing new competitors to enter the scene, it may be necessary
to ensure that companies do not abuse their market power or
enter into agreements that may reduce competition.
The founders of the European Economic Community were
well aware of the need for such balance. They recognized the
importance of competition to their endeavor to create a com-
mon market, and included a chapter on it in the Treaty of
Rome.' These rules deal not only with the private behavior of
companies, such as restrictions of competition and the abuse of
market power, but also address the phenomenon of subsidies
granted by Member States in a way that distorts competition
within the single market. Since 1958, competition policy has
gradually become one of the core policies of the European
Union. Without it, the various national trade barriers, which
were comprehensively eliminated by 1992, could have been rein-
stituted by private business arrangements aimed at deliberately
limiting competition. Competition policy is therefore a vital tool
in the maintenance of the single European market, the promo-
tion of economic integration, sustainable growth, competitive-
ness, and improved standards of living. By the same token, it is
also an essential component in the pre-accession cooperation
agreements that the EU has concluded with our Central Euro-
pean neighbors.
II. THE TRANSATLANTIC EXPERIENCE
One of the most striking phenomena in transatlantic, and
indeed, in global markets over the past decade has been the
growth of trade in services. Transatlantic trade in services is
growing both in absolute terms and in relation to merchandise.
U.S. service exports have risen by twenty-six percent since 1992,
and service exports to the European Union in 1996 were fifty-
seven percent of merchandise trade. This dynamism exposes
1. Treaty Establishing the European Community, March 25, 1957, arts. 85-94, 298
U.N.T.S. 42 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
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particularly good examples of the type of change that this Essay
tries to address.
The air transport and telecom sectors provide particularly
interesting, but contrasting, examples of service sectors which
have traditionally been shielded from competition but are now
increasingly open to international competition. In air transport,
state regulation of international airspace created barriers en-
couraging the development of national flag carriers, whereas the
telecom sector on both sides of the Atlantic originated from the
basis of single monopoly network providers. This has changed
dramatically in recent years, and now air transport and telecom-
munications are the most prominent sectors in which transatlan-
tic or worldwide partnerships are emerging, not least because of
the mobility and reach of aviation and telecom activities.
A. Air Transport Sector
In the air transport sector, the European Union and the
United States are the two largest players and the two most inter-
dependent markets in the world. Deregulation of the U.S. avia-
tion market since the late 1970s has had an enormous effect in
shaking up the domestic industry, resulting in efficient players
and more competitive prices. Deregulatory experience in the
EU has been slower, and in some ways more painful, as air trans-
port has gradually been brought into the ambit of community
competence. Because most European airlines originated as na-
tional flag-carriers, consolidation has manifested itself, not so
much in the disappearance of carriers, but in the form of airline
alliances. Although the intended end result on each side of the
Atlantic was the same - an open and competitive air transport
market - differences in timescale, historic development, and
environment have had somewhat different results. Nevertheless,
the EU and U.S. experience are now converging. With interna-
tional alliances currently proposed or agreed upon between
American Airlines and British Airways, United Airlines and Luf-
thansa, and Northwest and KLM to name but a few, it has be-
come increasingly difficult to distinguish between an EU or U.S.
carrier.
While airlines are on the way to competing globally, comple-
mentary regulatory instruments are lagging. An "Open Skies"
agreement between the European Union and United States
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would elevate regulation - for example, of landing rights and
allocation of airport slots - from our separate national legisla-
tive systems to the transatlantic level. Regarding the effects on
competition, both EU and U.S. authorities are united in their
aim to prevent industry realignments from producing adverse re-
sults, for example by imposing new monopolies on certain trans-
atlantic routes. The difficulties, however, encountered by com-
petition authorities in examining the proposed British Airways/
American Airlines alliance on both sides of the Atlantic high-
light the need to replace national rules by common procedures.
B. Telecom Sector
Transatlantic strategic alliances are not unique to air trans-
port. Telecom companies have also embraced them as a way to
maximize their coverage and presence in the transatlantic mar-
ket.
This development is all the more remarkable given the com-
pletely different starting points of the United States and Europe
when deregulation began in the 1980s; Europe had nationally-
owned telephone monopolies and the United States had AT&T.
The famous consent decree of 1982 finally led to the break up of
AT&T into regional Bell companies. In 1988, the European
Commission for the first time began using a treaty provision that
subjects state-owned monopolies to the competition disciplines
of the Treaty of Rome. 2 This process has been gradual and care-
ful, starting with the liberalization of the market for terminals,
moving on to liberalization of new services, and culminating in
full liberalization of voice telephony as of January 1, 1998. Ten
years may seem like a long time to open up the market, but let us
not forget that the original investigation into AT&T began in
1949! The World Trade Organization ("WTO") agreement on
Basic Telecommunications Services,3 signed by sixty-nine coun-
tries in February 1997, has gone one step further in instituting
liberalization at the international level.
As for the aviation industry, the opportunities afforded by
telecom liberalization on both sides of the Atlantic have spurred
2. Id. art. 90 298 U.N.T.S. 50.
3. See World Trade Organziation: Agreement on Telecommunications Services,
Feb. 15, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 366 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1998) [hereinafter Telecommu-
nications Services Agreement].
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business into action. British Telecom ("BT") and MCI were the
first to announce a major strategic alliance (although now super-
seded) and since then, Sprint, France Telecom, and Deutsche
Telekom have followed suit. Each has been the subject of scru-
tiny by the relevant competition authorities. One of the main
reasons the European Commission was able to approve the then
proposed BT/MCI alliance was the openness of their home mar-
kets. In the case of the Atlas alliance between Sprint, France
Telecom, and Deutsche Telekom, the two European companies
had to undertake to open their home markets to full competi-
tion in order to get the blessing of the European Commission.
In this way, existing competition rules, applied realistically, were
able to integrate the dynamics of innovation and globalization.
The future of telecom cannot be decided by a handful of
big players, and, for regulators, the problem remains of how to
ensure that efficient new companies spring out of newly opened
markets. It is not always possible to achieve the neat solution of
separating network and services - as the U.K. Government is
trying in its rail, gas, and electricity sectors. In the United States,
penetration of local markets by long distance companies and
vice versa has run into difficulties as mergers have created strong
regional accumulations of market power. Recognizing these
problems, signatories to the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecom
Services took a significant step in including some basic safe-
guards and regulatory principles, for example on safeguarding
conditions for interconnection and on universal service.4
C. Financial Services Sector
Turning to another example, in the last decade or so, the
financial services sector has been revolutionized by a combina-
tion of technological advances and internationalization. As we
enter the twenty-first century, a well-functioning financial serv-
ices sector is key to economic growth in any country. The suc-
cessful conclusion of the WTO financial services agreement on
December 13, 19975 - against a backdrop of currency turmoil
in Asia - was, therefore, a crucial achievement. It will open
more opportunities for our financial institutions and will pro-
4. See id. at 367-68.
5. Stuart S. Malawer, New Agreements and Cases in the World Trade Organization, 1
N.Y.L.J. 219 (1998).
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mote growth and stability in developing countries. At a time of
instability and uncertainty in world financial markets, the agree-
ment will increase confidence by showing that liberalization on a
global scale will continue. Naturally, increased internationaliza-
tion of financial services must go hand in hand with increased
co-operation among supervisory bodies. This is not just to pre-
vent a repetition of collapses such as those of Barings Bank and
Daiwa, but, more generally, to build financial systems that are
resilient and sound and that channel savings into investments
most efficiently. Efforts are underway to provide assistance and
ensure closer co-operation between supervisors by the G-7 and
international bodies such as the Basle Committee.
An example of a truly globalized service is electronic com-
merce, which offers enormous opportunities for consumers and
business worldwide. In 1996, US$1 billion worth of goods alone
were already traded electronically, but by the year 2000, the over-
all value of global electronic commerce is expected to reach over
US$200 billion.
What is unique about electronic commerce by comparison
to telecom, aviation, or financial services is that it emerged from
an environment free from regulation. Regulators everywhere
have been caught off-guard and are now trying to catch up with
developments in this virtual world.
Regulation is necessary and important in order to create a
predicable legal and commercial environment, with adequate
protection of public interest objectives such as privacy, preven-
tion of fraud, and consumer protection. But this is the first time
that a global form of business has developed spontaneously and,
thus, by necessity, regulators will only truly come to grips with it
at the global level. We otherwise risk creating heavy-handed na-
tional legal and regulatory barriers that would stifle what will un-
doubtedly be an engine of growth for the next century.
It is therefore of the utmost import that the United States
and the European Union promote broad understanding and
lead the way in defining how the principles of competition in the
off-line world can be enforced in the on-line environment. The
US-EU joint statement on electronic commerce, signed in De-
cember 1997,6 is a major step in the right direction to develop-
ing a global marketplace where competition and consumer
6. SeeJohn R. Schmetz, US and EU Conclude Agreement on Global Electronic Commerce,
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choice drive economic activity. But beyond this, we will need
agreement at the global level on specific issues, like the protec-
tion of privacy and personal data, the recognition of digital sig-
natures, taxation, encryption, domain names and trademarks,
and the establishment of basic uniform commercial practices.
Without such agreement, each of these could act as a non-tariff
barrier and stifle the benefits of global competition.
Already, in the related area of Internet access, problems
have arisen with complaints that Microsoft, a major global pro-
vider of operating systems, has been using its position with sup-
pliers to unfair advantage. Competition authorities on both
sides of the Atlantic are looking at the issue, but with different
responses from the company involved.
All the examples mentioned here refer to areas where we
have in fact managed to establish or to intensify free and open
competition across the Atlantic. This development towards in-
creased competition will benefit the business communities in-
volved, but it will, in particular, benefit consumers both in the
European Union and the United States - they will get a wider
choice of products, and they will get these products at a compet-
itive price. But as already alluded to, increased competion poses
new and difficult questions to regulators and guardians of com-
petition rules alike of how to keep pace with increasingly global-
ized businesses to ensure that markets remain Open and fair.
III. PROCEDURES
A. Bilateral
Regulators, negotiators, and the industry itself have used a
number of different instruments in order to stimulate competi-
tion in the transatlantic marketplace. The obvious, traditional
instrument is the bilateral agreement, a good example of which
is the recent EU-U.S. Mutual Recognition Agreement,7 which
aims at reducing costs and administrative barriers for imported
products, thus leading to improved market access. An agree-
ment opening up the air transport markets, which the European
4 INT'L UPDATE 10 (1997) (discussing statement signed in Washington, D.C. on Decem-
ber 5, 1997 at Transatlantic Summit).
7. WHITE HOUSE M2 PitEsswitE, THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA, Dec. 10, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 16295218.
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Union hopes to sign eventually with the United States, would be
another case in point.
B. Multilateral
By contrast, in the telecom sector, the groundwork for in-
creased competition has been laid at the multilateral level with
the conclusion of the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecom Serv-
ices8 described earlier. As noted, almost all parties to the agree-
ment subscribed not only to liberalization measures, but also to a
set of regulatory principles to guarantee conditions of fair com-
petition.
Industry plays an increasingly important role in the negotia-
tion as well as the implementation of such liberalizing initiatives.
It goes without saying that it is industry that drives international
competition and efficiencies in the first place by seizing market
opportunities and by pursuing cutting-edge solutions. But in-
dustry is also responsible for keeping markets open by maintain-
ing conditions of fair competition and abstaining from unfair
business practices.
'A unique and explicit example of co-operation between
business and governments with a view to eliminating barriers is
the Transatlantic Business Dialogue9 ("TABD") which, in No-
vember 1995, was launched almost simultaneously with the New
Transatlantic Agenda. This forum of high-level company repre-
sentatives has created the necessary pressure for the European
Union and United States to conclude a Mutual Recognition
Agreement"° that will do away with red tape on US$40 billion
worth of goods in the transatlantic market.
In spite of these valuable contributions by the private sector,
there are limits to the degree of responsibility that business
should have for general policy, a point on which there are, per-
8. See Telecommunications Services Agreement, supra note 3.
9. The Joint Report of the European and American Business Executives Dialogue
Conference, Seville, Spain, Nov. 10-11, 1995. The Report issued covered four areas
including standards and regulatory issues, trade liberalization, investment problems,
and third countries. See Judith Hippler Bello et al., International Trade Highlights in
1995, 30 Ir'L LAw 391, 400 (1996).
10. The Mutual Recognition Agreement will promote bilateral trade in goods by
facilitating the certification of products as being in compliance with local health, safety,
environmental, and technical requirements. See George A. Bermann, Regulatoy Coopera-
tion Between the European Commission and U.S. Administrative Agencies, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
933, 972 (1996) (discussing Mutual Recognition Agreement).
1998]
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haps, some philosophical differences between the European
Union and the United States. In Europe, we tend to favor a
more regulated approach than in the United States, where it is
believed that voluntary agreements and self-regulation can work.
These differences should not become a major sticking point as
long as both approaches are effective in delivering equivalent
results.
But bilateral, multilateral, and even self-regulation agree-
ments can only be part of the solution. In today's world where
companies increasingly operate on an international level, it is
important that competition authorities are able to keep up with
the effects of globalization. Governments, however, are severely
limited in their ability to monitor the activities of big, multina-
tional companies. Consequently, there is a greater need to ad-
dress private anti-competitive practices at an international level.
The European Union and the United States share similar
approaches in the handling of antitrust problems as well as a
commitment to enforcement, and as such are obvious partners
in the field of antitrust cooperation. Since 1991, we have oper-
ated a very successful competition cooperation agreement.
While this agreement relates only to procedures and to coopera-
tion, it has nevertheless been very useful for both authorities.
Dozens of cases have been modified under the 1991 agreement,
and seldom, if ever, have our authorities arrived at completely
divergent views. Even in the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger
case,11 where our competition authorities seemed headed in dif-
ferent directions, the consultations between the U.S. authorities
and the European Commission helped bring the matter to an
acceptable conclusion for all concerned. We are currently nego-
tiating a new agreement that will further strengthen our cooper-
ation and lead to a division of labor under the so-called positive
comity principle, so that one authority can ask the other to ex-
amine a case if its center of gravity is in the territory of the other.
While an important step, in the end, such bilateral co-opera-
tion can only take us so far. The globalization of business and
the advent of electronic commerce pose new challenges to our
11. The United States and the European Union, despite an agreement to co-oper-
ate on anti-trust enforcement, only narrowly avoided a clash in 1997 when Brussels
objected to the merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, even though it had been
approved by US anti-trust authorities. See Guy deJonquie'res, Van Miert Calls For Compe-
tition Rules Accord, FIN. TIMES 4, Jan. 31, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3528994
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governments' capacity to effectively enforce competition rules -
even where they co-operate with one another. Moreover, the
same business activity now falls with greater frequency under the
jurisdiction of two competition authorities, each of which must
apply its own competition rules. This can become complicated
for business if, for example, different authorities require divesti-
ture of different assets in order to grant approval.
This is why we believe that, in the longer term, a set of mul-
tilateral competition rules have to be developed, and why we are
pursuing a multilateral approach through discussions in the
WTO and the OECD. 2
There are already some provisions in the WTO under the
GATT,1" GATS, 14 and TRIPs15 agreements providing for consul-
tation and co-operation on anti-competitive practices. In addi-
tion, the broad national treatment and most-favored-nation rules
have some applicability to discriminatory competition rules.
The fact that the recent Kodak Fuji case 16 had to be brought
under the so-called "non violation" provisions of the GATT, how-
ever, simply illustrates that there are, at present, no specific suit-
able rules to cope with such cases that involve restriction of com-
petition brought about by an enlargement of public and private
activities.
This points to the need for the European Union and the
United States to make common cause in leading work at the
12. The members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment ("OECD") are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, INTRODUCTION TO THE OECD CODES OF LIBERALIZATION OF CAPITAL
MOVEMENTS AND CURRENT INVISIBLE OPERATIONS 2 (1995).
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. Pt. 5, 55
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
14. General Agreement on Trade in Services, in Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, opened for signature Apr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS].
15. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Annex IC, 33
I.L.M. 1197 (1994). [hereinafter TRIPs].
16. Kodak claimed that Fuji's substantial market position in Japan was the product
of anticompetitive conduct by Fuji. Initially, Kodak filed its claims before the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The
USTR referred the matter to the WTO. See Michael H. Byowitz, et. al., International
Legal Developments in Review: 1996 Business Regulation, 31 INT'L LAw. 413, 415-16 (1997).
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multilateral level towards a core of common principles and rules.
These could start in areas where international consensus can
most readily be secured - for example against hard-core cartels,
or instances of abuse of dominant position. WTO members
would make a common commitment to enforce such rules, and
this could then be subject to WNTO dispute settlement if mem-
bers were in breach of the rules in any way that violated the
rights and obligations of others. Of course, this would only work
to the extent that there were co-operation between competition
authorities such as exists between the United States and the Eu-
ropean Union. But this, in itself, would help to encourage the
development of competition rules in those countries where rules
do not yet exist.
IV. CONCLUSION
The inevitable trend towards globalization of business that
we are witnessing today has put tremendous pressure on govern-
ments to open up to international competition even those mar-
kets which have traditionally been protected as too sensitive and
nationally important. This Essay discusses examples of where
this process is currently underway - in the air transport,
telecom, and financial service sectors.
Opening markets on an international basis can be accom-
plished through different means. In the transatlantic context,
we have used bilateral agreements in the case of our mutual rec-
ognition agreements. On a multilateral level, WNTO agreements
on basic telecom and financial services will serve to open up
these sectors to competition. But, it is well recognized that com-
petition left to its own devices in these areas will not necessarily
produce optimal results. In particular, in cases where new en-
trants have to rely on the infrastructure of a previous monopo-
list, some rules are needed to ensure equal access on a fair basis.
In other cases, some regulation may be necessary to safeguard
the interests of the marginal consumers. At the same time, it is
desirable to have rules to preserve competition and prevent any
one player from gaining too much market power.
Regulators and competition authorities have started to rec-
ognize that, just as markets open up internationally, they need to
respond with adequate safeguards and competition rules at an
equivalent level. In their 1991 bilateral agreement, the Euro-
TRADE AND COMPETITION
pean Union and the United States have taken the first steps in
co-operating on competition rules. Multilaterally, the WTO
agreement on telecom includes pro-competitive regulatory prin-
ciples which will guide the efforts of members to open up their
telecom markets. Taking matters a step further, the WTO work-
ing group on trade and competition has started to address, on a
more comprehensive basis, the effects of differing national com-
petition rules, or the absence of such rules, and the differing
views of regulatory authorities on trade.
But the example of electronic commerce, which poses both
a challenge and an opportunity to develop a single set of global
regulatory principles, shows that, if we are to keep up with in-
creasingly globalized markets, in the end both regulators and
the guardians of competition must go further. It will not be easy
to agree on even a core of common competition rules, but with-
out them we risk instituting, through duplicate competition
processes and overlapping regulation, the same kind of barriers
to business that liberalization has sought to remove in the first
place.
1998]
